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To Build a Network
BY JOHN ARQUILLA
Dr. John Arquilla is Professor and Chair in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval 
Postgraduate School He is the author of many articles on a wide range of topics in military and 
security affairs. His books include Network and Netwars and Afghan Endgames.
The fundamental dynamic of the Cold War era was an arms race to build nuclear weapons. But in the long, often covert, “cool war” against al-Qaeda and its affiliates that began in earnest after September 11, 2001, the driving force has been – and continues to be – an 
“organizational race” to build networks. It has grown increasingly apparent that the latest advances 
in information technology have greatly empowered flat, essentially leaderless groups unified more 
by pursuit of a common goal than any kind of central control. In the elegant phrasing of David 
Weinberger, co-author of a key contribution to the emerging information-age canon, The Cluetrain 
Manifesto, networks, particularly web-enabled ones, are comprised of “small pieces loosely 
joined.”1  Weinberger’s language offers a particularly apt description of al-Qaeda today, as the 
group’s original concentrated core, formed around Osama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
has long since given way to a far flatter, much more widely dispersed set of relatively independent 
cells and nodes.  
Thus has the world’s premier terrorist network survived over a dozen years of major efforts 
aimed at its eradication. Indeed, far from being on “the verge of strategic defeat,” as former 
defense secretary Leon Panetta was wont to say,2  al-Qaeda has thrived by redesigning itself away 
from any serious reliance on central leadership. In this way, the targeted killings of any number 
of “high-value targets,” including of course bin Laden himself, have had little effect on the orga-
nization’s viability and vitality. So today a handful of American forces are back in Iraq fighting 
the al-Qaeda splinter group ISIS – and the country is burning. In Syria, al-Qaeda, ISIS and others 
are leading the fight against the Assad regime, much as terrorist networks played a similar role in 
the overthrow of Libyan dictator Moammar Qaddafi – and may have been involved, at least tan-
gentially, in the humiliation inflicted upon the United States by the attack on the American 
diplomatic mission in Benghazi.3  The al-Qaeda network is operating in many other places, too: 
Algeria, Mali, Mauretania, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen – to name just a few locales.  
It is as if the death of bin Laden opened up al-Qaeda’s “strategic space,” creating room for 
the networked global insurgency envisioned a decade ago by its leading strategist, Abu Mus’ab 
al-Suri, in his Global Islamic Resistance Call. Over the past few years, al-Qaeda has taken on almost 
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all of the characteristics of al-Suri’s “call.” He 
was captured in Pakistan in 2005, and later 
turned over to the Assad regime – his nom de 
guerre means “the Syrian.”4  Rumor intelligence 
suggests that al-Suri was released in the wake 
of the rebellion in Syria, but there have been 
no confirmed public sightings. This hardly 
matters. As he himself would no doubt say, it 
is the leaderless network concept that is impor-
tant. There is no need to have a great man at 
the head of the organization. No one is in 
charge and, for a “dark network” of terrorists, 
it is far better to operate without a formal lead-
ership structure. As al-Suri makes clear in his 
writings, the flatter the network, the better.5  
 Clearly, al-Qaeda is fully invested in the 
organizational race to build networks. That ter-
rorists would take so well to networking is 
something my long-time research partner 
David Ronfeldt and I have been worrying 
about for the past two decades. Our response 
back in the mid-1990s to the then-embryonic 
threat from terrorist networks was to contend 
that, in a great conflict between nations and 
networks, the generally hierarchical structure 
of nations would not serve them well in efforts 
to come to grips with networks. And so from 
early on we saw a need to enter the organiza-
tional race by starting to build networks of our 
own. Our key point:  “It takes networks to fight 
networks.”6  Many have taken up this mantra 
in the eighteen years since we first intoned it, 
most notably General Stanley McChrystal, per-
haps the most network-oriented of all 
American military leaders.7  Sadly, some loose 
comments by a few of his subordinates about 
2007 al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQIM) network chart in Mosul.
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senior political leaders led to his dismissal. 
Thus an articulate voice in favor of taking a 
more networked approach was removed from 
the fight – a terrible self-inflicted wound from 
which the U.S. military has yet to recover fully. 
And the problem goes well beyond the 
armed services. In the realm of intelligence, for 
example, the most significant organizational 
change made in the years since 9/11 was to add 
yet another vertical layer to the existing hierar-
chy by creating a directorate of national intel-
ligence. The commission members charged – 
by the President and Congress – with finding 
potent remedies to the lapses that contributed 
to the surprise attacks on America in 2001 were 
in total agreement about calling for much 
greater inter-organizational cooperation and 
information sharing. Nevertheless, their policy 
recommendation was to create an entity that 
would wield ever greater central control. 
The wiring diagram for the new director-
ate makes this abundantly clear in the final 
report of the 9/11 Commission.8  And the one 
other major organizational change made to 
the U.S. government was the creation of a 
Department of Homeland Security – yet 
another massive, bulky hierarchy. Its sheer size 
and complexity contributed significantly to the 
slow, confused response to the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster back in 2005. But if the civil-
ian departments and agencies of the U.S. gov-
ernment have had a difficult time grasping the 
art of building networks, the military, by way 
of contrast, has shown a considerable and 
growing aptitude for doing so. 
Some military-oriented examples of 
network-building
Given that small but key groups of civilian and 
military leaders accept the notion that the best 
tool for countering a hostile network is a 
network of one’s own, the central issue has 
come to revolve around exactly how one 
should go about building a network. The 
mixed experiences with creation of a director-
ate of national intelligence and the homeland 
security apparatus imply that fruitful insights 
into networking are perhaps more likely to be 
found “out at the edges” rather than at the 
policy-making core. And sure enough, even a 
modest amount of investigation quickly yields 
very interesting results. For it is “out there” that 
counterterrorist networks have formed up and 
have achieved some quite remarkable results. 
One of the lesser known but more success-
ful network enterprises operates out of a for-
mer French Foreign Legion base, Camp 
Lemonnier, in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. 
From here just a few thousand soldiers, 
Marines, and civilians operate in conjunction 
with allies and many departments of the U.S. 
government to illuminate dark terrorist net-
works as a first step toward eliminating them. 
New York Times reporters Eric Schmitt and 
Thom Shanker have thoughtfully assessed the 
operation in this way:
To an unusual degree, the mission has 
lashed together the government’s entire 
national security structure. Officers there 
describe a high level of cooperation among 
conventional military forces, the more 
secretive special operations teams, and the 
Amer ican inte l l igence  communi ty. 
Representatives from other government 
agencies, including customs and agricul-
ture, routinely pass through.9      
With a decade of counterterrorism suc-
cesses to its credit, along with major contribu-
tions to humanitarian aid and demining oper-
ations, the network operating out of Djibouti 
has gained official acceptance – after some 
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early efforts by the Pentagon to close it down 
– and is seen as “the centerpiece of an expand-
ing constellation of half a dozen U.S. drone 
and surveillance bases in Africa, created to 
combat a new generation of terrorist groups 
across the continent, from Mali to Libya to the 
Central African Republic.”10   
In short, Camp Lemonnier serves as the 
key node – the hub, in fact – of a hub-and-
spokes network that ties together civilian and 
military personnel from the United States and 
its allies in the war against al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates. And the results achieved with rela-
tively minute manpower and but a tiny frac-
tion of the level of material resources devoted 
to, say, the campaign in Afghanistan,11 have 
been remarkable. With amazing economy of 
force the Djibouti operation has played a key 
role in helping to inflict defeats on al-Qaeda 
and affiliates in Somalia, Yemen, and other 
locales that fall within its area of responsibil-
ity.  
Moving from the Horn of Africa to the 
Philippines, one can find another excellent 
example of successful networking. With 
around 600 soldiers, the Combined Joint 
Special Operations Task Force – Philippines 
(CJSOTF-P) has worked closely with the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines to inflict 
stinging blows on the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front and the related but more criminally-
oriented Abu Sayyaf Group. Beyond its suc-
cesses in counterterrorist field operations, the 
CJSOTF-P has also played a key role in ensur-
ing the completion of civic improvement proj-
ects that have built schools, roads, and medical 
and disaster relief facilities. Its work has drawn 
high praise from the NGO community as well. 
Mark Schneider, a senior vice president with 
the International Crisis Group, views the 
CJSOTF-P “as a success story, especially in 
terms of winning hearts and minds through 
civic action and medical assistance projects.”12 
Another key networking success “at the 
edge” unfolded in, of all places, Iraq. From the 
outset of the mass uprising that began in ear-
nest in August 2003, the insurgency there 
proved nettlesome, with levels of violence 
against innocent Iraqis mounting precipitously 
by 2006, a time when nearly 100 non-combat-
ants were being killed each day.13 Yet, by the 
end of 2008, the violence had receded, with 
civilian deaths decreasing by about three-
fourths, to the 9,000/year range. And the casu-
alty rates continued to drop sharply until U.S. 
forces left at the end of 2011. However, the 
violence arose once again in the wake of the 
American departure, with losses in 2013 
amounting to the worst level in the past five 
years.14 The conventional wisdom about why 
things got dramatically better seven years ago 
was that President George W. Bush’s decision 
to send an additional 28,000 troops to Iraq – 
“the surge” – finally gave commanders suffi-
cient resources to deal effectively with the 
insurgency.15  
But what turned the campaign in Iraq 
around was not simply the addition of five bri-
gades. There was also a critically important 
shift to a new concept of operations based on 
the idea of getting off the few dozen large for-
ward operating bases (FOBs) on which most 
U.S. troops were posted and redeploying them 
– in platoon-sized packets, with similar-sized 
friendly Iraqi forces – to well over a hundred 
small outposts in areas where the violence was 
worst. Thus a physical network emerged, one 
comprised of many small nodes, improving 
the response time to attacks, the intelligence-
gathering process, and overall relations with 
the populace.  
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 The physical outpost network was com-
plemented by the rise of a social network that 
grew from reaching out to many of the Sunni 
insurgents who had been fighting the occupi-
ers for years. Some 80,000 of them switched 
sides, becoming the “Sons of Iraq” who 
formed such a big part of the Awakening 
Movement that drove a serious wedge between 
al Qaeda operatives and the Iraqi people. The 
“surge brigades” were not really necessary to 
achieve these results, as there were never more 
than about 10 percent of the troops in-country 
operating from these outposts, or more than 
about another 10 percent involved in supply-
ing them, or protecting them from nearby 
“overwatch” positions. The key had simply 
been the willingness to adopt a network-build-
ing turn of mind, something that many pla-
toon and company commanders, and their 
immediate superiors, had begun to do at the 
grassroots level, even before the surge.16     
By 2008, with the additional surge bri-
gades now gone, it was clear to all that the 
counterinsurgency was not primarily a num-
bers game. The key was to populate the physi-
cal network with platoon-sized outposts and 
to keep reaching out to the Iraqi people. This 
was the way to “illuminate and eliminate” the 
enemy network. General Petraeus put the mat-
ter best in his commander’s guidance of June 
2008:
You can’t commute to this fight. Position 
Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, 
and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we 
intend to secure. Living among the people 
is essential to securing them and defeating 
the insurgents. 
We cannot ki l l  our way out of  this 
endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must 
identify and separate the “reconcilables” 
from the “irreconcilables” through engage-
ment . . . We must strive to make the rec-
oncilables a part of the solution, even as we 
identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive 
out the irreconcilables.   
Defeat the insurgent networks . . . Focus 
intelligence assets to identify the network.17       
Thus was a network built that defeated the 
al-Qaeda network in Iraq, and kept the levels 
of violence down – for years, until after the 
American withdrawal and the subsequent 
alienation of the Sunnis by the Baghdad gov-
ernment, which gave the terrorists the oppor-
tunity to come back.
Network-building from the Byzantines 
to the Battle of Britain  
Clearly, the central organizational insight into 
network-building is the notion of being will-
ing to create a large number of small units of 
action, and allowing them to operate relatively 
freely in pursuit of a common goal – even if in 
the absence of any serious degree of direct cen-
tral control. While the recent examples of net-
work-building described in the previous sec-
tion are both interesting and valuable, it is 
important to mine earlier history as well for 
ideas about networking. “Looking back” is a 
very useful way to “look ahead.” The way to do 
it is to search for examples of the creation of 
systems comprised of many small nodes, cells, 
or units of action.  And, while not particularly 
abundant, there are indeed some quite salient 
examples.  
The security strategy of the Byzantine 
Empire comes easily to mind. Constantinople 
outlasted Rome by a thousand years. How? In 
part by making the most of its limited 
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resources. For centuries, the extensive eastern 
land frontier – the western part of the empire 
was shored up by Byzantine naval mastery – 
was subject to continual raids and invasions. 
There were never enough troops to maintain a 
preclusive, perimeter defense. So instead the 
Byzantines resorted to an extensive system of 
small outposts whose mission was to detect 
and pass the word of incursions – by couriers, 
with signaling mirrors, fire at night and smoke 
by day – to military “hubs” where armored 
cavalry striking forces were at the ready. In this 
way, attackers gained only a minimal advan-
tage of surprise, and were soon beset from 
many sides (I would say, “swarmed”) by quick-
reaction forces.18   
The “field manual” of the time, the Tenth 
Century C.E. De Velitatione – which translates 
as Skirmishing – makes clear that a networked 
defensive system can also be used on the offen-
sive – particularly if coupled with the vibrant 
intelligence networks that the Byzantines nur-
tured along the edges of their empire. Edward 
Luttwak’s recent research into this security sys-
tem has led him to conclude that it enabled a 
“military renaissance” a millennium ago that 
gave the Byzantine Empire a new lease on life. 
As Luttwak puts it so well, about the more pro-
active aspect of the strategy, “the aim is to do 
much with little, with raids by relatively small 
forces that magnify their strength by achieving 
surprise.”19  Bernard Montgomery, one of the 
great captains of the 20th century, expressed 
much admiration for the Byzantine ability to 
use swarm tactics, offensively and defensively, 
noting how the network of outpost garrisons 
and mobile strike forces succeeded against a 
range of adversaries, from Avars to Arabs.20   
A modern historical example that featured 
elements quite similar to the Byzantine net-
work can be found in the defensive system 
propounded by Air Chief Marshal Hugh 
Dowding of the Royal Air Force – whose 
Fighter Command won the Battle of Britain in 
1940. German military forces, fresh from a 
string of blitzkrieg victories culminating with 
the fall of France, found themselves unable to 
cross the English Channel – so an attempt was 
instead made to try to bomb Britain into sub-
mission from the air. Pre-war estimates of the 
destructive potential of strategic air attack had 
been particularly dire, and there was much 
debate about the correct defensive organiza-
tional form to adopt and the right combat doc-
trine to employ.  
A major point of view was the “big wing” 
school of thought, whose goal was to mass as 
much defensive force as possible – in practical 
terms, this meant crafting units of action com-
prised of three squadrons, some 75-90 fighters 
– against enemy bomber streams. The prob-
lems with this system were two-fold: Luftwaffe 
leaders were clever about where they were 
going to strike next, often switching direction 
after crossing the British coast; and, even when 
the target areas were known, big wings would 
take a long time to come together from scat-
tered airfields. One of Dowding’s chief subor-
dinates – and a key supporter – was Air Vice-
Marshal Keith Park, who argued that “the 
assembling of large formations of fighters was 
both time-wasting and unwieldy.”21   
Instead of this approach, Dowding and 
Park preferred to allow single squadrons of just 
two dozen fighters to engage the large attack-
ing bomber formations – and their fighter 
escorts – independently, as soon as informa-
tion that flowed in about German intentions 
from any of the forty Chain Home radar sta-
tions positioned along the coast was con-
firmed by the relevant outposts of the 
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thousand-node Observer Corps network that 
was sprinkled all over southeastern England.22 
It turned out that Dowding and Park were 
right; the networked, swarm-oriented approach 
won out. Dowding, however, nicknamed 
“Stuffy,” had made many enemies, and was 
sacked as soon as the crisis passed. Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill and most of 
Britain’s senior military leadership may not 
have properly valued or rewarded Dowding for 
what he had achieved, but official German war 
documents make clear that the Luftwaffe had a 
correct understanding of how and why their 
campaign failed:
The defense was forewarned of each attack 
by an unbroken chain of radar stations, 
which made surprise almost impossible. 
This and astute ground control saved the 
British fighter arm from being knocked out 
and German air sovereignty being won.23     
The 30,000 civilian volunteers of the 
Observer Corps – the human nodes in the vast 
early-warning network formed to help defend 
their country against air attack – made out bet-
ter than Dowding. They refused to be paid for 
their services; but in April 1941 King George VI 
made them the Royal Observer Corps in recog-
nition of the contribution they made to victory 
in the Battle of Britain.24 
A Systematic Approach to Network-
Building
It should be clear from the foregoing examples 
– both the more recent and ongoing ones, as 
well as instances from earlier eras – that net-
work-building hardly requires resort to 
alchemy. The foundational requirement, orga-
nizing into Weinberger’s “small pieces, loosely 
joined,” is fairly simple to meet – if institu-
tional opposition is overcome – and the power 
of the “small and many” can be seen in all the 
cases considered. But there is surely more that 
is necessary to build strong, effective networks. 
For David Ronfeldt and me, there are four 
additional areas beyond organizational design 
that must be addressed in the network-build-
ing process:  the network’s narrative; its social 
basis; the operating doctrine employed; and 
the technological “kit” required.25
The narrative is the story that draws people 
to the network – and keeps them in it, even in 
adversity. Of the examples considered in this 
article, the Iraqi Awakening Movement pro-
vides perhaps the most salient case wherein a 
whole counterinsurgent network was energized 
and enlivened by a narrative about how al-
Qaeda operatives were exploiting Iraqis, and 
that coalition forces were coming to outposts 
right among the people to protect, serve, and 
liberate. A measure of the effectiveness of this 
narrative was the fact that many tens of thou-
sands joined the Sons of Iraq in support of this 
effort. The sharp drop in violence – mentioned 
earlier – that soon followed is yet another indi-
cator that this narrative had positive effects.
In terms of the social aspect of the network-
building process, the great challenge is in 
bringing together actors from diverse places 
and making the network the focus of their loy-
alty. Militaries in most countries bring in 
recruits from all over their societies and create 
cohesion in service to “the nation.” Terrorist 
organizations like al-Qaeda have been able to 
do this sort of thing, too, the difference being 
that they instill a loyalty to the network. In al-
Qaeda’s case, and among its affiliates, the abil-
ity to do this has been aided, quite often, by 
skillful exploitation of religious and kinship 
ties. Nation-states seldom have similarly 
strong social bonds; and social cohesion is fur-
ther complicated by the fact that members of 
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networks are generally drawn from organiza-
tions, services, or the various departments of 
government to whom they continue to feel 
primary loyalty.
Dealing with the social component is not 
easy, but I would say that the U.S. Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM) provides an 
example of the successful creation of a sense 
of community among military elites drawn 
from all of the services. While all retain the 
outer trappings and many of the inner prac-
tices of their parent services, there is at the 
same time a crucially important sense of social 
fraternity and trust that goes beyond the color 
of their uniforms.  
The current challenges for SOCOM at this 
social level of networking are to: 1. foster a 
strong sense of common identity among mem-
bers of the relatively recently created United 
States Marine Corps Special Operations 
Command (MARSOC); and 2. make a similar 
social connection with international military 
elites in pursuit of the “global special opera-
tions network” that Admiral William McRaven 
has made the centerpiece of his long-term 
SOCOM strategy. As he put it in June 2013 
when his plan was first unveiled;
I need to get the military buy-in first, and 
then very quickly we move to the inter-
agency (community), and then very 
quickly we move to our partners and 
allies.26 
Clearly, he understands that network-
building requires a very sound social founda-
tion.
The doctrine, or concept of operations, that 
networks of all sorts employ – from mass pop-
ular movements like the Arab Spring to insur-
gents and, increasingly, even conventional 
traditional military operators – is to “swarm.” 
Their many small elements become habituated 
to coming together, often from several points 
of the compass, to converge upon a particular 
place and/or opponent. For a social swarm this 
might be Tahrir Square; for an outpost-and-
outreach counterinsurgent network the conver-
gence could come on a more operational scale 
– as was the case in Anbar Province in Iraq 
several years ago. Even the early historical cases 
considered herein reflected use of swarm tac-
tics. Both the Byzantines on their eastern fron-
tier and the Royal Air Force in the Battle of 
Britain swarmed their opponents. Networks 
swarm. If you intend to build one, make sure it 
has a capacity for swarming.
Technological “kit” is the final foundational 
element to which network-builders should be 
attentive. It is crucially important that a net-
work’s communications be capable of great 
throughput, but with a high level of security. 
Sad to say – from a counter-terrorist perspec-
tive – al-Qaeda and its affiliates have learned 
to use the world wide web and the Internet 
ubiquitously and securely. The network of 
nations aligned against the terrorists has suf-
ficient levels of connectivity, but not yet the 
degree of security needed for the most efficient 
operations. The Byzantines offer an interesting 
example here: when they wanted to send out 
warnings of incursions without the raiders 
knowing, they used riders to pass the word – 
reasoning that smoke or fire signals would 
alert their enemies. Less technology may, at 
times, make for better security.  
But even with the availability of high-
throughput, secure communications will prove 
ineffective if the organizational design of a 
network is vertically- (i.e., hierarchically-) 
rather than horizontally-oriented to maximize 
linkages among the many, small nodes that 
form the best networks. Thus in closing this 
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discussion of key factors in network-building, 
we return to the theme of “small pieces, 
loosely joined,” the implication being that 
organizational design is first among equals. If 
the organizational structure is not right, even 
the greatest narrative and a strong, trust-based 
social ethos will end up being sub-optimized. 
What next for networks?
Clearly, Admiral McRaven’s effort to build a 
global special operations network is the broad-
est, boldest effort under way at present. But 
another interesting network-building enter-
prise was forming up, albeit on a smaller scale, 
in Afghanistan. The village stability operations 
(VSO) concept there has been very much an 
exercise in network-building. The core idea is 
quite similar to the outpost-and-outreach sys-
tem that emerged in Iraq, beginning in 2006: 
small American detachments live with Afghan 
locals and operate from their villages.
The VSO concept tacitly recognizes that 
the center-outward nation-building experi-
ment in Afghanistan should take a back seat to 
an “edges-inward” network-building approach. 
The original plan was to have over 100 of these 
“small pieces” in place, but this goal has fallen 
victim to the Obama administration’s desire to 
depart from Afghanistan as swiftly as possible. 
Perhaps events in Iraq will encourage some 
rethinking, and the original VSO plan will be 
reinstated. While some resist the idea hat the 
networked approach taken in Iraq can also be 
used to good effect in Afghanistan, others have 
argued forcefully that the most important, 
usable lesson from Iraq is that “it takes a net-
work to fight a network.”27
A U.S. Soldier assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan where patrols were 
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Thus the hypothesis about the value of 
network-building in the fight against terrorists 
and insurgents is undergoing a quite rigorous 
“field test” right now in Afghanistan. Wouldn’t 
it be useful if there were also such a test for 
networking closer to home, in the area of gov-
ernance? Given the very low approval levels 
that elected officials currently suffer under, 
perhaps one thing that even bitter partisans 
might agree upon would be to try something 
bold, in terms of organizational redesign of 
government. There is even a bit of a blueprint 
in place, thanks to the work of Leon Fuerth, 
formerly the national security adviser to Vice 
President Al Gore.  
Since 2001, Dr. Fuerth has been exploring 
the possibility of moving to a nimbler, more 
networked model of American governance – 
and has knitted together his own network of 
experts along the way. His and his team’s work 
addresses clearly all five of the network-build-
ing factors that David Ronfeldt and I think are 
essential. So in addition to Admiral William 
McRaven’s global initiative, and the emerging 
VSO network in Afghanistan, I would very 
strongly recommend pursuit of a third experi-
ment in network-building based on Leon 
Fuerth’s ideas about “anticipatory gover-
nance.”28 
Given the evidence presented in this arti-
cle of cases of successful network-building – 
both recently and in the more distant past – 
and the clear evidence that insurgents and 
terrorists have been racing to expand and 
improve their networks, we can only hope that 
our leaders make a firm decision to enter the 
“organizational race” as well. PRISM
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